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Summary 
The euro area continues to recover from the Great Recession, with several recent 
publications offering optimistic assessments of the euro area’s economic performance. 
The European Commission’s “Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2017” 
report, for example, praises moderate economic growth and “solid net job creation” in a 
“job-rich recovery”. While the European Commission acknowledged ongoing challenges 
such as youth unemployment, it must also be recognised that the euro area’s recovery 
has been piecemeal. Economic growth is encouraging, but it obscures the unemployed 
millions who have not tasted the fruits of the recovery. The euro area’s labour market, 
while posting gains, remains in a worse state than before the Great Recession. Nearly half 
of the unemployed in the euro area have been jobless for over a year. In contrast with 
the United States, Japan and other regions hit hard by the crisis, the euro area’s labour 
market exemplifies the most enduring damage of the Great Recession. European 
lawmakers need to soberly acknowledge the job market’s failures and take targeted 
action, addressing the regions and demographics for whom the recovery is not working.  
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lthough some countries in the euro area began to recover from the Great Recession as 
early as 2009, for many it has been more of a whimper than a roar. Despite encouraging 
signs such as moderate GDP and multifactor productivity growth,1 the region has yet to 
reach its pre-crisis levels of employment. With such a tepid recovery, Alvin Hansen’s (1938) 
words on secular stagnation seem prophetic:  
This is the essence … sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which 
feed on themselves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of 
unemployment.2 
This is not to say that the euro area is destined to repeat Japan’s post-1990 performance, as a 
minority of economists, including Larry Summers, would maintain. The point is that in other 
markets hit hard by the Great Recession, notably the US, labour markets have long since 
recovered, recording job gains and low unemployment. Conversely, the euro area only began 
posting job gains in 2013, while high unemployment persists to the present day. This leads us 
to two observations: i) the most enduring loser of the Great Recession is the euro area’s labour 
market, and ii) lawmakers ought to acknowledge that fact and devote greater attention to 
fostering a job-rich recovery.  
1. The enduring unemployment problem  
The euro area’s GDP has improved since the Great Recession and the debt crisis, buoyed by 
private consumption, supportive macroeconomic policies and low energy prices.3 The World 
Bank estimates that the euro area will experience roughly 1.5% GDP growth into 2019,4 
representing a stable outlook for the foreseeable future. It is comparable to the 1.9% that the 
World Bank predicts for the US (2% by the Congressional Budget Office’s own estimate),5 and 
significantly better than Japan’s 0.6% forecast.6 Nevertheless, this economic growth in the 
eurozone has been accompanied by a long period of labour market stagnation that is unique 
to the area. 
                                                     
1 European Commission (2017), “Employment and Social Developments in Europe - Annual Review 2017”, ISSN: 
2315-2540. 
2 A.H. Hansen (1939), “Economic progress and declining population growth”, The American Economic Review, 
29(1), 1-15. 
3 European Commission (2016), “Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe - Annual Review 2016”, ISSN 
2443-6771. 
4 World Bank (2017), “Global Economic Prospects”, Washington, D.C. 
5 Charles Whalen (2016), “Uncertainties in the Economic Outlook”, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C.  
6 Bank of Japan (2017), “Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices – April 2017”, Tokyo. 
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The euro area’s unemployment rate for 2016, as shown in Figure 1, stood at 10.04%, in sharp 
contrast to 3.14% in Japan and 4.91% in the US. While Japan’s unemployment rate is currently 
lower than at any time this century, and the US rate has returned to its historically low levels, 
the euro area’s unemployment rate remains high by both OECD standards (6.32% mean) and 
compared to its own pre-crisis levels (7.50% mean for 2008). Around one-half of the 
unemployed in the euro area have been jobless for a year or more,7 compared to 14.4% for the 
US. The youth unemployment rate in the euro area sits above 18%.8 Perhaps the only 
encouraging euro area employment rate is that for women, who rose to record-high 
employment in 2016. 
Figure 1. Unemployment rates in the euro area vs the US, 2007-17 (%) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using seasonally-adjusted data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and Eurostat. 
The absolute labour force numbers for the euro area 
are similarly poor. In 2007Q4, total employment in the 
euro area was around 3.5 million greater than in the 
US. As of 2016Q4, total employment in the euro area 
was around 150,000 less.9 While the US labour market 
grew steadily from 2010 onwards, the euro area only 
picked up three years later. In fact, the US has posted 
                                                     
7 European Commission (2017), op. cit. 
8 Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017), “Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey”, US Department of 
Labor.  
9 Eurostat (2017), “Unemployment rate - quarterly data, seasonally adjusted”. 
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job gains for 81 consecutive months beginning in October 2010.10 The euro area has only 
experienced a growth in jobs since 2013Q4. 
Some would attribute labour market trends to demographics, arguing that low US 
unemployment is deceptive. For example, a study by Thomas Klitgaard and Richard Peck at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York suggests that low unemployment in the US is largely due to 
a shrinking workforce.11 This is a fair point, but misleading when intended to present the euro 
area’s labour market as normal. While demographics may help explain the low unemployment 
rate across the Atlantic, they cannot explain the euro area’s lack of job growth and generally 
weak labour performance. The bottom line is that midway through 2017, despite all the talk of 
recovery, the total euro area labour force has yet to return to 2007Q4 levels. 
Figure 2. Total employment in euro area vs the US, 2007-17  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on seasonally-adjusted data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and Eurostat. 
2. The bigger picture  
However, not all labour market indicators paint a bleak picture for the euro area. Even before 
the Great Recession, as shown in Figure 3, labour force participation rates in the euro area and 
the US were moving in opposite directions and they continue to do so. US labour force 
participation has been on the decline for some time, particularly in response to the Great 
Recession. Discouraged Americans of prime working age have dropped out of the labour force 
                                                     
10 Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017), “Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics 
survey (National)”, US Department of Labor.  
11 Thomas Klitgaard and R. Peck (2014), “Comparing U.S. and Euro Area Unemployment Rates”, New York Federal 
Reserve, 4 February.  
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in large numbers12 at the same time that more Americans aged 65 and up continue to work 
later in life.13 In fact, the euro area’s labour force participation rate recently converged with 
that of the US, which might suggest that the euro area’s long-term labour market outlook is not 
as dire as the doomsayers would have us believe. It also highlights the limitations of 
unemployment rates to allow a full understanding of labour market conditions. 
It would be folly, however, to understate Europe’s persistently poor job performance. Even if 
certain longer-term trends such as labour force participation rates indicate that the US is on 
the wrong track while the euro area is improving, it cannot obscure two factors: i) the euro 
area’s high total, youth, and long-term unemployment and ii) the tardy recovery of the 
European labour market, which only resumed growth three years after the US.  
Figure 3. Labour market participation rates in the euro area vs the US, 2000-16 
 
Note: Labour market participation is calculated as the sum of the employed and unemployed aged 15-64 years 
old, divided by the total population of the same ages. The converging lines indicate that prime age workers in the 
US and the euro area currently participate at similar rates. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the OECD and Eurostat. 
 
                                                     
12 Yuki Noguchi (2016), “An Economic Mystery: Why Are Men Leaving The Workforce?”, National Public Radio, 6 
September. 
13 John Hanc (2017), “Workers are Working Longer – and Better”, New York Times, 2 March. 
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3. Conclusions and recommendations  
Some would downplay the significance of these factors, arguing that the euro area’s labour 
market performance is highly differentiated and that its poor showing is largely due to a few 
lagging economies. But we find this reasoning unpersuasive. As shown in Figure 4, strong-
performing member states and sub-regions have counterparts in the US, while weak 
performers do not. As of Q1 2017, the highest unemployment rates for the US were in Alaska 
and New Mexico: around 6.5%. By comparison, Greece’s unemployment stood at 23% in 
October 2016. Even excluding Greece as an outlier, Italy has double the unemployment rate of 
the worst-performing US states, and Spain roughly triple. As of April 2017, 41 out of 50 US 
states have unemployment rates below 5%, 20 states stand below 4% and five states below 
3%.14 
Figure 4. Share of states by unemployment rate: US vs euro area (annual averages 2016) 
 
Note: Unemployment rates are annual averages for 2016, using the 50 US states and the 19 member countries of 
the euro area. For example, Germany, Luxembourg and Malta fall between 4-6% unemployment, representing 
16% of the euro area’s member states. 
Source: Own elaboration using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and Eurostat. 
 
In short, the labour market of the euro area is the most enduring loser of the Great Recession, 
whether one is considering unemployment rates or absolute employment numbers. A recent 
European Commission publication reported modest labour market improvements and praised 
a “job-rich recovery”,15 but policymakers must guard against interpreting such reports as 
grounds for satisfaction. Instead, they must redouble their efforts to stimulate the labour 
market, concentrating on its most vulnerable and problematic areas. That means targeting the 
                                                     
14 Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017), “Local Area Unemployment Statistics”, US Department of Labour.  
15 European Commission (2017), op. cit.  
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regions where unemployment is the highest, as well as demographic groups whom the recovery 
has passed over – notably the long-term unemployed and youth. Above all, it means continuing 
the efforts to ensure that macroeconomic conditions are conducive to jobs growth. 
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